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Introduction
Optional two-part pricing, extensively used by many public utilities (electricity, water, railways ...), gives, as shown by Sharkey and Sibley (1993) [4] , some freedom to redistribute the social surplus. 1 These authors show in a partial equilibrium framework that, when a monopoly proposes a menu of contracts, each specifying the fee and the charge price, it is possible for a social planner controlling this monopoly to redistribute towards the weak demand consumer. Our contribution is not to extend their study to a new framework or to other pricings. Our ambition is, first, to emphasize the redistributive mechanism of optional two-part pricing, notably with the help of some graphical presentations, and, second, to propose a simple incentive mechanism implementing the more redistributive optima. As we will see, this mechanism takes advantage of the dual relationship between the program of the discriminating monopoly and the social planner's program.
This note is organized as follows. The economy is described in section 2. The constrained Pareto optima are characterized in section 3 even though an implementing mechanism is proposed and studied in section 4. Limits and possible extensions of this work are discussed in the last section.
The economy
There are two goods, the produced good and the numéraire one. Their quantities are respectively noted q and w. The economy is composed of two types of agents, indexed i = 1, 2, defined by their quasi-linear utility functions:
The functions V i verify the following properties :
Assumption 1 V i is continuously twice differentiable with :
and :
1 See also Roberts (1979) [3] for the case of non-linear pricing.
Relations (1) state that the inverse demand is positive and strictly decreasing. Relation (2) implies that type 2's demand is higher than type 1's; for quasi-linear utility functions this relation is also the standard single crossing assumption.
The cost function C of the monopoly which produces the good q verifies the following assumption :
The monopoly using this technology proposes two contracts (p 1 , E 1 ) and (p 2 , E 2 ), where p 1 , p 2 are the usage charges, E 1 and E 2 the fees. As asymmetric information prevents perfect discrimination, the contracts must be incentive-compatible. Moreover, in order to eliminate trivial cases, we will suppose that First-best optima are characterized by strictly positive consumptions.
Constrained Pareto optima
In this section, the constraints regimes of the Paretian program are specified. Then, the Pareto frontier is outlined and the main properties of optimal contracts are discussed. This section doesn't propose any new results, its aim is simply to clarify the characterization of the Pareto frontier and above all to present, with the help of a graphic, a pedagogical analysis of the redistributive mechanism of the optional two-part pricing.
In our economy, the constrained Pareto program is :
and n i is the number of agents of type i.
To discuss the constraints regimes of P p (s 2 ), it is useful to consider the first-best optima which verify the incentive constraints. Actually, as for every first-best optimum, prices are equal to the marginal cost, incentive constraints require equality of fees. Hence, there is a unique first-best optimum which verify the incentive constraints, the so-called Coase two-part pricing. The types surplus at the Coase solution are noted s co 1 and s co 2 .
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In the following, only the domain s 2 < s co 2 is studied 4 . In this domain the binding incentive constraint is (IC 2 ).
5 To know if (SC 2 ) binds, it is useful to introduce the Rawlsian solution defined by the maximization of the type 1 surplus subject to incentive and budget constraints. As these constraints always bind, the Rawlsian objective function, after some substitutions, can be rewritten:
where the social surplus
As usual in this literature, we assume the concavity of this function, and hence the unicity of the Rawlsian solution
i is the surplus of type i at this Rawlsian optimum 6 , two cases must be distinguished depending on whether s 2 is above or below s
7 , the constrained Pareto program is equivalent to maximize W R (p 1 , p 2 ) subject to (SC 2 ). The (assumed) strict concavity of W R implies two results. First, (SC 2 ) is binding, second, the second-best frontier, in the surplus space (s 1 , s 2 ), is continuous and strictly monotonic (see figure 1 ).
The remaining question is what are the properties of the optimal contracts along the second-best frontier. As, for s R 2 ≤ s 2 < s co 2 , only incentive and participation contraints of type 2 bind, the program P p (s 2 ) is reduced to the following :
Of course, the Coase solution only exists if the fixed cost is not too big with respect to the demand. 4 The other case is symmetrical. To extend our results to the domain s 2 > s co 2 , one only needs to rewrite program P p (s 2 ) by permuting indices, i.e. one needs to maximize s 2 subject to the participation constraint of type 1.
5 The space being limited here and the proof being classical, it is not reproduced in this note. 6 As by assumption s For each s 2 , first-order conditions give optimal prices:
where
is the marginal revenue upon type 1 and λ the Lagrangian multiplier. 8 8 Equation (6) can be rewrited as follows :
We note that for λ = n 2 /n 1 , we obtain the Coasian prices :
. Otherwise, one could show that for λ = 0, p 2 = p R 2 . So, intuitively, we could interpret λ as a relative weight of type 2 in a linear social welfare function; but, this interpretation assumes the concavity of the Pareto frontier (in the surplus space). Equation (5) reflects the fact that p 2 is not an incentive tool when one tries to increase the type 1 surplus above its Coasian level 9 . Secondly, we can easily prove that p 1 > C 0 . Indeed, either Rm 1 > C 0 , or Rm 1 ≤ C 0 : in the first case, we have of course p 1 > C 0 , and, if Rm 1 ≤ C 0 , equation (6) implies that p 1 > C 0 . Furthermore, after some manipulation, the differentiation of (IC 2 ) gives :
Along the constrained Pareto frontier (for s R 2 < s 2 < s co 2 ), ds 1 /ds 2 < 0, one gets from equation (7) : dp 1 /ds 2 < 0. Hence, to raise s 1 , the social planner must decrease s 2 , i.e. increase p 1 . The intuition of this result can be grasped graphically.
In figure 2 , the Coasian equilibrium is depicted by points A and B in the space (q, T ) where T is the total spending of each type. The upward line passing through these points is the nil profit line; it is also the spending line of each type when the fee is E and the price equal to the marginal cost c 10 . The curves passing through A and B are the iso-surplus curves corresponding respectively to types 1 and 2.
At the Coase optimum, and in fact at each constrained Pareto optimum, the only way to increase s 1 is obviously to decrease s 2 . Nevertheless, for this, one needs to release the incentive constraint of type 2, i.e. to decrease the surplus of the dishonest type 2. Starting from the Coasian point A, the only way to proceed is to raise p 1 (with an appropriate adjustment of E 1 leaving s 1 constant) 11 . As the surplus of the dishonest type 2, reached at point F, is now only s 0 2 (< s 2 ), the social planner can extract at most dπ 2 with the new contract (E 0 , c). As we can see in figure 2 , the increase of budget surplus dπ 2 over type 2 exceeds the budget loss dπ 1 over type 1.
12 So, starting from the Coase equilibrium, such an adjustment leaves a positive net budget surplus which, equally redistributed to check incentive constraints, increases type 1's surplus 13 .
Since it permits more redistributive surplus allocation than the Coase solution, optional two-part pricing is a useful tool for the social planner. But, if he doesn't directly control the monopoly, implementation of the constrained optima is questionable : how can he induce the monopoly to select the right two-part pricing?
Implementation by discriminating monopoly
In this section we build mechanisms which implement the more redistributive optima. To reach this aim we study a regulated monopoly, the so-called monopoly à la Edgeworth. 14 This monopoly is supposed to use optional twopart pricing and is subject to an additional constraint to leave a minimal surplus to type 1. The implementing mechanisms are then deduced from the duality relation between the discriminating program of this monopoly and the Rawlsian program; this duality relation was incidentally noticed by Roberts (1979) ([3] , p. 80-81) in a continuous types economy but for a non linear pricing.
Before introducing the monopoly à la Edgeworth, let us first introduce the program of the simple discriminating monopoly using optional two-part pricing :
and begin to show that the Rawlsian prices are also the monopolistic ones. Proof. Under assumption 1, (IC 2 ) and (P C 1 ) are the only active constraints and one gets :
Proposition 1 The Rawlsian prices
Hence, after substitutions, the objective function becomes :
The end of the proof is now obvious.
Consequently, the monopoly equilibrium and the Rawlsian solution differ only by E 1 and E 2 . In fact, this result hides a fundamental link between them: they are the two polar solutions of the monopoly à la Edgeworth. The latter is a discriminating monopoly with an additional surplus constraint for type 1 :
As one can easily demonstrate using classical arguments, equation 2 of assumption 1 implies that (SC 1 ) and (IC 2 ) are the only binding constraints. After manipulations, the program P em (s 1 ) is reduced to the subsequent free maximization : max
Optimal prices and quantities are independent of s 1 level and equal to the monopoly ones. By raising s 1 (from 0 to s R 1 ) , all surplus distributions between the monopoly equilibrium and the Rawlsian solution can be achieved. Actually, for s 1 = s R 1 , the program of the monopoly à la Edgeworth is the dual of the Rawlsian program. So, naturally, it gives not only the same prices but also the same fees. Of course, the monopoly à la Edgeworth is an abstract mechanism since s 1 is exogenous.
A way to make the mechanism more realistic is to consider a mutualist mechanism, i.e. a profit sharing device. In our framework, one can view a mutualist monopoly as a firm which redistributes all its profit to its members 15 according to a sharing key. If this key is contingent upon the chosen contracts, membership guarantees a part of the profit even if the member doesn't consume. Furthermore, we will suppose that this sharing key is fixed ex ante and the profits are redistributed ex post. The mutualist monopoly's customers are thus considered just as shareholders. Therefore, it is natural to suppose that the aim of the mutualist monopoly is to maximize profit. Finally, for a sharing key ³ θ 1 , θ 2 , θ´the program of this monopoly is then :
where θΠ is the guarantee share profit and θ i Π is the profit share of type i.
Proposition 2
If the monopoly profit is uniformly distributed, θ 1 = θ 2 = θ, the mutualist monopoly equilibrium gives the Rawlsian surplus to each type.
Proof. With the uniform sharing key, the program is reduced to the program P m . So the optimal quantities and fees are the Rawlsian ones.
The intuition of the previous proposition can be easily grasped graphically (see figure 3) . Points A and B correspond to the private monopoly equilibrium (where s 1 = 0)
16 . Because of the quasi-linearity of preferences, a uniform monetary transfer (to both types) implies a vertical translation of the Edgeworthian monopoly equilibrium : when a surplus s 1 is granted to type 1, the private equilibrium is translated to the new equilibrium represented by A 0 and B 0 .
15 If the good produced is a public utility, all agents are potential consumers and can be viewed as members of the mutualist monopoly. 16 As it is depicted, a further rise of p 1 doesn't increase the net profit (0 < dπ 2 = −dπ 1 ). Proof. With the price cap p, the monopoly program becomes :
Assumption 1 always implies that (IC 1 ) and (IC 2 ) can't be both binding. As (P C 2 ) is released, (IC 2 ) must bind, and (IC 1 ) is then loosened. So, (P C 1 ) is active and the program P mpc (p) is reduced to :
For right values of p (p 
Conclusion
This note explores the redistributive properties of optional two-part pricing in a two type economy. It shows that a monopolistic structure market augmented by a uniform profit sharing allows one to implement the most redistributive optimum, the Rawlsian solution. If a price-cap is added, this mutualist mechanism allows one to achieve less redistributive constrained optima. However, there are three caveats to bear in mind.
First, in a pure mutualist mechanism, only customers share profit, even though, in the proposed mechanism, each agent receives profit independently of his consumption decision. However, as here each agent is a customer, the difference is blurred. So, this mechanism can only be applied to a subset of quasi-universally consumed goods, such as electricity, water, public transport.
Second, the efficiency of this mechanism requires of course the social planner to have such precise information as to prevent managers and employees from capturing profits. So, the mechanism supposes a strict monitoring of the managers.
Last, a strong implicit assumption of this paper is the fact that the social planner has a unique redistribution tool : public pricing. Of course, in a more general framework he can also use income taxation. So, a natural extension would be to study the complementarity between discriminating public pricing and income taxation. 18 
